The techniques of the blind and partially blind signatures play an important role in numerous applications, most prominently in electronic voting and electronic cash. In this paper, we first present formal definitions of leakage-resilient blind and partially blind signatures. Subsequently, we propose an efficient leakage-resilient blind signature scheme and an efficient leakage-resilient partially blind signature scheme in the continual leakage model. The proposed leakage-resilient blind signature scheme is the first protocol which is secure even in a setting where the adversary may obtain leakage information on the signer's or user's internal state, including secret key and the randomness. However, in the only known leakage-resilient blind signature scheme which was proposed by Rückert, the adversary is given the leakage information only about the signer's secret key. The proposed partially blind signature scheme is the first leakage-resilient partially blind signature scheme. Also, we analyse their security and efficiency in the generic bilinear group model. Keywords: blind signature; partially blind signature; leakage-resilient; bilinear pairings; e-commerce.
Introduction
To give an electronic equivalent of the paper-based idea of having a document signed, Rivest et al. (1978) constructed signature scheme. Once raised, signature schemes were widely used to protect data's authenticity and integrity. In the past few decades, a lot of signature schemes have been proposed aiming at different application scenarios (Chaum, 1982; Faust et al., 2010; Feng and Li, 2013; Ma, 2014; Okamoto, 1992; Zhang and Kim, 2002; Zhang et al., 2013) .
Among them, blind signature has its unique role in applications, especially in e-commerce.
Blind signature, introduced by Chaum (1982) , provides anonymity of users in applications such as electronic voting and electronic payment systems, etc. In contrast to regular signature schemes, a blind signature scheme is an interactive two-party protocol between a user and a signer. It allows the user to obtain a signature of a message in a way that the signer learns neither the message nor the resulting signature. Blind signature plays a central role in building anonymous electronic cash. There are several blind signatures having been proposed in the random oracle (Pointcheval and Stern, 2000; Zhang and Kim, 2002) or the standard model (Okamoto, 2006; Seo and Cheon, 2012) .
Partially blind signature was introduced in Abe and Fujisaki (1996) , which allows the signer to explicitly include common information in the blind signature under some agreements with the receiver. Intuitively, blind signature is a special case of partially blind signature where the common information is a null string. In the past few years, there are several partially blind signatures having been proposed (Chen et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2003) .
Traditionally, we assume that the participant's internal state is completely hidden to the adversary when we prove the security for blind and partially blind signatures. However, in the real-world implementations of cryptographic primitives, the adversary may be able to obtain some additional information not captured by the traditional assumption. Adversary can detect the additional information by exploiting side-channel attacks such as running-time (Kocher, 1996) , electromagnetic radiation (Gandolfi et al., 2001) , power consumption (Kocher et al., 1999) , fault detection (Biham and Shamir, 1997) and so on. Generally, the traditional provable secure protocols were not secure when facing the side channel attacks. Given that, it is very significant to construct cryptographic protocols which can resist side-channel attacks. Therefore, in the past few years, cryptographers have made tremendous progress toward modelling security in face of side-channel attacks, and there has been an extensive amount of researches to construct leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives, such as leakage-resilient encryption schemes (Alwen et al., 2010; Dziembowski and Pietrzak, 2008; Micali and Reyzin, 2004; Naor and Segev, 2009; Yuen et al., 2012) , leakage-resilient signature schemes (Faust et al., 2010; Galindo and Vivek, 2013; Katz and Vaikuntanathan, 2009; Malkin et al., 2011) and the leakageresilient interactive protocols (Bitansky et al., 2012; Boyle et al., 2012 Boyle et al., , 2013 Garg et al., 2011) . However, as far as we know, there is only one existing leakage-resilient blind signature scheme in the bounded leakage model (Rückert, 2010) . In Rückert (2010) , the author showed how to turn Lyubashevsky's identification scheme into a blind signature scheme. The blind signature scheme in Rückert (2010) only tolerates the leakage about the signer's secret key (tolerates leakage of a fraction of the secret key). Although the blind signature protocol in Rückert (2010) may resist some leakage attacks, it does not resist to the more general leakage attacks (such as memory attack), which may depend on the entire internal state of the parties. In this paper, we will propose the secure blind signature scheme under the setting that the adversary can obtain continual leakage information about the parties' internal state. Meanwhile, we will present the first leakage-resilient partially blind signature scheme in the independent and continual leakage model.
Our contribution:
In this work, we first formalise the definition of leakage-resilient blind and partially blind signature schemes. Then, we present the efficient leakage-resilient blind and partially blind signature schemes with given definitions. A brief introduction of our results are as follows. Galindo and Vivek (2013) provided a signature scheme that based on the Boneh-Boyen IBE scheme (Boneh and Boyen, 2004) . Meanwhile, Galindo and Vivek adopted the techniques by Kiltz and Pietrzak (2010) to propose a leakage-resilient version of their signature scheme. Dziembowski and Faust (2011) proposed a leakage-resilient Okamoto identification based upon the same leakage assumption as this paper.
Followed the ideas of Galindo and Vivek (2013) and Dziembowski and Faust (2011) , we present a leakage-resilient blind signature scheme and a partially blind signature scheme based on the signature scheme in Galindo and Vivek (2013) . For all we know, the proposed leakage-resilient blind signature scheme is the first blind signature scheme that tolerates leakage about the parties' whole internal state. As we have already discussed, the only existing leakage-resilient blind signature scheme can tolerate the leakage only about the signer's secret key rather than the parties' whole internal state. And likewise, the proposed leakage-resilient partially blind signature scheme is the first leakage-resilient partially blind signature scheme.
In addition, under the independent and continual leakage model, we prove that our constructions are secure in the generic bilinear group model.
Organisation: This article is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present some preliminaries that are used in our construction. In Section 3, we propose the formal definitions of leakage-resilient blind and partially blind signature schemes. In Section 4, we present the concrete construction of our leakage-resilient blind signature scheme and the security proof of it. We present the concrete construction of our leakage-resilient partially blind signature scheme and its security proof in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 is conclusion.
Preliminary
In this section, we present some basic notations and preliminaries for this paper. We denote * to be the component wise multiplication of two vectors. Let N be the set of natural numbers, for n ∈ N, we denote [1, n] for {1, …, n} and negl(n) for a negligible function of n. Let Z be the set of integers, Z q (q > 0) denote the set of integers {0, …, q -1} and * q be the set of integers {1, …, q -1}. We write PPT for probabilistic polynomial time.
Notations

Bilinear groups and generic bilinear group model
Let BG be a probabilistic bilinear group generator that, on input the security parameter 1 κ where κ ∈ N, outputs the description of a bilinear mapping as ( , , , , ( , ) )
1 G = <g> and G T are multiplicative cyclic groups with a same order q, where q is a κ-bit prime. , ∈ q a b In generic group model (Shoup, 1997) , the group elements are encoded by unique but randomly strings, thus the adversary can but test whether two elements are equal. The generic bilinear group model (Boneh et al., 2005) is an extension of the generic group model. In the generic bilinear group model, the encoding of elements of G and G T are respectively given by randomly chosen injective maps : q γ → Γ and :
, where Γ and Γ T are sets of bit strings and we assume that .
The group operations in G and G T , the evaluation of the pairing are performed by three public oracles O, O T and O e , respectively. For any , ,
Without loss of generality, for the generator g of G, we assume that
Leakage-resilient Okamoto identification protocol
In our constructions, U will adopt Okamoto identification scheme (Okamoto, 1992) to prove the correctness of the messages he was sending during the signature issuing protocols. Let g 1 and g 2 be two generators of G and the discrete logarithm 1 2 log g g is unknown. Then, the prover P has the secret key
where prime P is the order of G, and the public key Dziembowski and Faust (2011) proposed the leakageresilient version for Okamoto identification protocol
Oka x x pk g g
In their leakage-resilient version, verification is exactly the same as in the standard Okamoto protocol, while the key generation and the computation of the prover is adjusted to protect against leakage attacks. In their construction, P selects a row vector
such that matrix product L × R = (x 1 , x 2 ) and stores sk = (L, R) in the memory rather than (x 1 , x 2 ). In our leakage model, we require that adversary A gets leakage from L and R independently. The detail of the leakage-resilient Okamoto identification protocol
Oka x x pk g g is described in detail in the following table.
V pk g g
Step 1 Step 2: P computes
Step 3: P computes the n × 2 matrix Z = W + cR
Step 4:
Under the independent and continual leakage model, Dziembowski and Faust proved that their leakage-resilient protocol can tolerate (0.15n -3)logq -1 bits leakage on the prover's internal state under the DL assumption.
Partially blind signature
In the scenario of partially blind signatures, the signer S and the user U are assumed to have agreed on a piece of common information, denoted by info. In some applications, an info may be sent from U to the S , while in other applications it may be decided by S . In our scheme, this negotiation is considered to be done outside of the scheme. A partially blind signature scheme Π consists of four PPT algorithms ( , , , ) G S U V . The specification is as follows:
• Algorithm G takes a security parameter 1 κ and outputs a public and secret key pair (pk, sk).
• Signer S and user U engage in the signature issuing protocol and stop in polynomial-time. The inputs of S contain (pk, sk) generated by ) (1 κ G and info And 's U inputs contains the public key pk, the common information info and a message m. When the signature issuing protocol stop, the output of S is either completed or not-completed. Similarly, the output of U contains either ⊥ or (m, σ).
• V takes (pk, info, m, σ), it accepts if σ is a valid signature on m under (pk, info) and otherwise rejects.
Note that this definition includes that a definition of blind signature scheme, because blind signature is a special case of partially blind signature where the information info shared by the signer S and the user U is a null string, ⊥.
Leakage model and definitions
In this section, we give the detailed description of the leakage model and the formal definitions of leakageresilient blind and partially blind signature schemes.
Leakage model
Up to now, there are mainly three different types of leakage models:
1 The only computation leaks information model, introduced by Micali and Rayzin (2004) , relies on the basic assumption that only computation leaks information, that is, no leakage in the absence of computation. There are many leakage-resilient schemes are secure in this leakage model (Dziembowski and Pietrzak, 2008; Micali and Reyzin, 2004) .
2 The memory leakage, or the relative leakage model, introduced by Akavia et al. (2009) . This model is more general and enables the adversary learn any efficiently computable function of the internal state of the uncorrupted party, only subject to the constraint that the amount of information leaked is bounded. Cryptographic schemes which are leakage-resilient in that model can resist cold-boot attacks (Halderman et al., 2008) which is not resisted by the schemes in only computation leaks information model.
3 The continual leakage model (Brakerski et al., 2010; Dodis et al., 2010; Yuen et al., 2012) , there is a key update algorithm that continually refreshes the secret key, while only bounding the leakage between updates. Obviously, the continual leakage model is a generalised result of the memory leakage model.
In this work, we split the memory of a physical device into two parts, which leak independently. In other word, we structure any computation that involves access to the internal state into a sequence of steps. In each step, the adversary can obtain information only about the active part of the memory, but not the other part. We model the leakage by giving the adversary A a leakage oracle Ω(L, R), where L, R ∈ {0, 1} n are the two parts of the memory. For some t ∈ N, A can adaptively submit a sequence leakage . We restrict that in total the adversary A learn from each L and R is not more than λ. We refer to such A as λ-limited adversary.
As we are interested in the continual leakage model, it is necessary that the internal state must be stateful. Otherwise, after some implementations the entire internal state of participant will be leaked completely. We refer to this restricted leakage model as independent and continual leakage model. Similar restrictions have been used in several previous works (Dziembowski and Pietrzak, 2008; Faust et al., 2010; Galindo and Vivek, 2013; Kiltz and Pietrzak, 2010) .
In our constructions, the user's internal state is not necessary to update since the user has different internal states in different invocations. However, we must update the signer's internal state in time, because the secret key sk is included in his internal state. Let the initial internal state of S be (L 
Definitions
Next, we present the definitions of leakage-resilient blind and partially blind signature schemes. Unlike the traditional definitions of secure blind and partially blind signatures, we give the adversary additional abilities to access to the leakage oracle Ω. • one-more unforgeability in the leakage setting.
Completeness is defined as with digital signature schemes, that is, every honestly created signature for honestly created keys and for any messages m M ∈ has to be accepted under this key.
(Partially) blindness of ( , , , )
Π G S U V in the leakage setting is defined through the following experiment among malicious signer * S and two honest user 0 U and 1 U : The most powerful attack on a blind signature is one-more signature forgery introduced by Pointcheval and Stern (2000) . The one-more unforgeability in the leakage setting of a (partially) blind signature scheme is formalised in the following experiment 
• If 0 σ ≠⊥ and 1 σ ≠⊥ ,
We define 
Leakage-resilient blind signature scheme
In this section, we present a leakage-resilient blind signature scheme and prove the security of it under the independent and continual leakage model.
Construction
We now proceed to describe the concrete construction of our leakage-resilient blind signature scheme that is obtained from the signature scheme in Galindo and Vivek (2013) . In our protocol, we assume that S and U denote the signer and the user respectively. First of all, the signer S calls the key generation algorithm G to obtain a secret key sk, a public key pk and sends pk to U . S stores implementation of the blind signature generation algorithm, U commits to the message m i to be signed using the public key pk and random number t i , and proves the correctness of his commitment utilising the leakage-resilient identification protocol Oka (Dziembowski and Faust, 2011 ' , ) ( i i S S . It is not hard to notice that our protocol maintain a stateful secret key. Therefore, we will prove that our construction is secure in the continual leakage model. Let ( , , , ) LR BS − Π G S U V be a leakage-resilient blind signature scheme on the message space , * q the formal description is given in the following table:
( , ) , If S accepts the protocol Oka, then:
Step 1: S randomly selects , Proof: Because our construction has the same form of signature with Galindo and Vivek (2013) , we can obtain our one-more unforgeability from the existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA) in Galindo and Vivek (2013) directly. Therefore, we omit the detailed description of the proof.
Leakage-resilient partially blind signature scheme
This section presents the proposed partially blind signature scheme which is resilient to the continual leakage.
Construction
Let BG be a probabilistic bilinear group generator as shown in Section 2. Here, we assume that the signer S and the user U agree on a common information 0 info = i m in an predetermined way before the i th invocation of the partially blind signature generation algorithm. Meanwhile, we also require that the common information 0 i m and the message 1 i m to be signed are elements in q * . In our leakage-resilient partially blind signature scheme, we adopt the same technique of above protocol Π LR-BS to maintain a stateful secret key. The concrete structure of the leakage-resilient partially blind signature scheme ( , , , )
given in the following table: If S accepts the protocol Oka , then:
Step 1: S randomly selects , Step 2: S computes 
Correctness and security analysis
Correctness: The verification of the proposed partially blind signature scheme Π LR-PBS is justified by the following equations: 
Security analysis: The following theorem establishes the security of the scheme:
Theorem 5.1: In the generic bilinear group model, the proposed partially blind signature scheme Π LR-PBS is blind and one-more unforgeable in the independently and continual leakage setting.
The proof is almost the same as that in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2.
Efficiency
We analyse the computation overhead of the proposed schemes and summarise the result in the following table (we ignore the group operation). We denote e the exponentiation computation and p the pairing operation. We note that n is not a parameter of the schemes, it is a parameter in the leakage-resilient Okamoto identification protocol for increase the leakage parameter (0.15n -3)log q -1. In our construction, we require that 1 (1) log , 2 − = o q λ thus n = 24. Therefore, our constructions are efficient.
Conclusions
In this paper, we first formalise the definition of leakage-resilient blind and partially blind signature schemes. Then, we present the efficient leakage-resilient blind and partially blind signature schemes based on the signature scheme in Galindo and Vivek (2013) . Our schemes are proved secure (blindness and one-more unforgeability) and resilient to independent and continual leakage in the generic bilinear group model. It is not difficult to find that we can utilise our method to construct the blind and partially blind signature schemes based on Waters signature scheme, however, the obtained schemes will not be efficient enough because of a series of zero-knowledge proofs. So the open problem may be to construct efficient leakage-resilient blind and partially blind signature schemes in the standard model.
